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Abstract. We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games
with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but ar-
bitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time al-
gorithm for computing balanced solutions for these games. In addition,
we prove that an instance has a balanced solution if and only if it has
a stable one. Our methods use a new idea of reducing an instance with
general capacities to a network bargaining game with unit capacities de-
fined on an auxiliary graph. This represents a departure from previous
approaches, which rely on computing an allocation in the intersection of
the core and prekernel of a corresponding cooperative game, and then
proving that the solution corresponding to this allocation is balanced.
In fact, we show that such cooperative game methods do not extend
to general capacity games, since contrary to the case of unit capacities,
there exist allocations in the intersection of the core and prekernel with
no corresponding balanced solution. Finally, we identify two sufficient
conditions under which the set of balanced solutions corresponds to the
intersection of the core and prekernel, thereby extending the class of
games for which this result was previously known.
1 Introduction
Exchanges in networks have been studied for a long time in both sociology and
economics. In sociology, they appear under the name of network exchange theory,
a field which studies the behaviour of agents who interact across a network to
form bilateral relationships of mutual benefit. The goal is to determine how an
agent’s location in the network influences its ability to negotiate for resources
[1992]. In economics, they are known as cooperative games and have been used
for studying the distribution of resources across a network, for example in the
case of two-sided markets [1971] [1984].
From a theoretical perspective the most commonly used framework for study-
ing such exchanges is that of network bargaining games. The model consists of
an undirected graph G = (V,E) with edge weights w : E(G) → R+ and ver-
tex capacities c : V (G) → Z+. The vertices represent the agents, and the edges
represent possible pairwise contracts that the agents can form. The weight of
each edge represents the value of the corresponding contract. If a contract is
formed between two vertices, its value is divided between them, whereas if the
contract is not formed neither vertex receives any profit from this specific con-
tract. The capacity of each agent limits the number of contracts it can form.
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This constraint, together with an agent’s position in the network determine its
bargaining power.
A solution for the network bargaining model specifies the set of contracts
which are formed, and how each contract is divided. Specifically, a solution
consists of a pair (M, z), where M is a c-matching of the underlying graph G, and
z is a vector which assigns each edge uv two values zuv, zvu ≥ 0 corresponding
to the profit that agent u, respectively agent v, earn from the contract uv. To
be a valid solution, the two values zuv and zvu must add up to the value of the
contract whenever the edge uv belongs to the c-matching M , and must be zero
otherwise.
Solutions to network bargaining games are classified according to two main
concepts: stability and balance. A solution is stable if the profit an agent earns
from any formed contract is at least as much as its outside option. An agent’s
outside option, in this context, refers to the maximum profit that the agent can
rationally receive by forming a new contract with one of its neighbours, under
the condition that the newly formed contract would benefit both parties. The
notion of balance, first introduced in [1983], [1984], is a generalization of the Nash
bargaining solution to the network setting. Specifically, in a balanced solution
the value of each contract is split according to the following rule: both endpoints
must earn their outside options, and any surplus is to be divided equally among
them. Balanced solutions have been shown to agree with experimental evidence,
even to the point of picking up on subtle differences in bargaining power among
agents [1999]. This is an affirmation of the fact that these solutions are natural
and represent an important area of study.
There is a close connection between network bargaining games and coopera-
tive games. Specifically given a solution (M, z) to the network bargaining game
(G,w, c) we can define a corresponding payoff vector x, where xu is just the total
profit earned by vertex u from all its contracts in the solution (M, z). Then this
vector x can be seen as a solution to a corresponding cooperative game (N, v)
defined as follows: we let N = V (G) denote the set of players, and for every
subset S ⊆ N of players, we define its value ν(S) as the weight of the maxi-
mum weight c-matching of G[S]. This game is also known as the matching game
[1971]. The subsets S ⊆ N are referred to as coalitions, and the value ν(S) of
each coalition is interpreted as the collective payoff that the players in S would
receive if they decide to cooperate. The players are assumed to be able choose
which coalitions to form, and their objective is to maximize their payoffs.
The underlying assumption in cooperative game theory is that the grand
coalition N will form, and the question becomes how to distribute the payoff
ν(N) among the players. A vector x describing such a distribution is referred to
as an allocation. Given an allocation x, the excess of a coalition S is defined as
ν(S)−x(S). Intuitively, a negative excess means that the players of the coalition
have no incentive to break away from the grand coalition, since the collective
payoff they could achieve by forming the new coalition is less then what they
are currently receiving. The power of player u over player v with respect to the
allocation x is the maximum excess achieved by a coalition which includes u but
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excludes v. Two important concepts from cooperative games are those of the
core and prekernel. The core consists of allocations for which no coalition has a
negative excess, whereas the prekernel consists of all allocations with symmetric
powers.
Our contribution and results. Our main result is providing the first poly-
nomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for network bargaining
games with general capacities and fully characterizating the existence of bal-
anced solutions for these games. Specifically we show the following results in
sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively:
Result 1. There exists a polynomial time algorithm which given an instance
of a network bargaining game with general capacities and a maximum weight
c-matching M , computes a balanced solution (M, z) whenever one exists.
Result 2. A network bargaining game with general capacities has a balanced
solution if and only if it has a stable one.
Our method relies on a new approach of reducing a general capacity instance
to a network bargaining game with unit capacities defined on an auxiliary graph.
This allows us to use existing algorithms for obtaining balanced solutions for
unit capacities games, which we can then transform to balanced solutions of our
original instance. This represents a departure from previous approaches of [2010]
which relied on proving an equivalence between the set of balanced solutions and
the intersection of the core and prekernel of the corresponding matching game.
In section 3.1 we show that such an approach cannot work for our case, since
this equivalence does not extend to all instances of general capacity games:
Result 3. There exists an instance of a network bargaining game with gen-
eral capacities for which we can find an allocation in the intersection of the
core and prekernel such that there is no corresponding balanced solution for this
allocation.
Despite this result, we provide two necessary conditions which ensure that
the correspondence between the set of balanced solutions and allocations in
the intersection of the core and prekernel is maintained. Using the definition of
gadgets from section 3.2 we have the following result given in section 3.3:
Result 4. If the network bargaining game has no gadgets and the maxi-
mum c-matching M is acyclic, the set of balanced solutions corresponds to the
intersection of the core and prekernel.
Related work. Kleinberg and Tardos [2008] studied network bargaining
games with unit capacities and developed a polynomial time algorithm for com-
puting the entire set of balanced solutions. They also show that such games have
a balanced solution whenever they have a stable one and that a stable solution
exists if and only if the linear program for the maximum weight matching of the
underlying graph has an integral optimal solution.
Bateni et al. [2010] consider network bargaining games with unit capacities,
as well as the special case of network bargaining games on bipartite graphs where
one side of the partition has all unit capacities. They approach the problem of
computing balanced solutions from the perspective of cooperative games. In
particular they use the matching game of Shapley and Shubik [1971] and show
3
that the set of stable solutions corresponds to the core, and the set of balanced
solutions corresponds to the intersection of the core and prekernel.
Like we do here, Kanoria et al. [2009] also study network bargaining games
with general capacities. They show that a stable solution exists for these games
if and only the linear program for the maximum weight c-matching of the un-
derlying graph has an integral optimal solution. They are also able to obtain a
partial characterization of the existence of balanced solutions by proving that if
this integral optimum is unique, then a balanced solution is guaranteed to exist.
They provide an algorithm for computing balanced solutions in this case which
uses local dynamics but whose running time is not polynomial.
2 Preliminaries and definitions
An instance of the network bargaining game is a triple (G,w, c) where G is a
undirected graph, w ∈ R|E(G)|+ is a vector of edge weights, and c ∈ Z|V (G)|+ is a
vector of vertex capacities. A set of edges M ⊆ E(G) is a c-matching of G if
| {v : uv ∈M} | ≤ cu for all u ∈ V (G). Given a c-matching M , we let du denote
the degree of vertex u in M . We say that vertex u is saturated in M if du = cu.
A solution to the network bargaining game (G,w, c) is a pair (M, z) where
M is a c-matching of G and z ∈ R2|E(G)|+ assigns each edge uv a pair of values
zuv, zvu such that zuv + zvu = wuv if uv ∈M and zuv = zvu = 0 otherwise.
The allocation associated with the solution (M, z) is the vector x ∈ R|V (G)|
where xu represents the total payoff of vertex u, that is for all u ∈ V (G) we have
xu =
∑
v:uv∈M zuv. The outside option of vertex u with respect to a solution
(M, z) is defined as
αu(M, z) := max
(
0, max
v:uv∈E(G)\M
(
wuv − 1[dv=cv] min
vw∈M
zvw
))
,
where 1E is the indicator function for the event E, which takes value one when-
ever the event holds, and zero otherwise. If {v : uv ∈ E(G)\M} = ∅ then we set
αu(M, z) = 0. We write αu instead of αu(M, z) whenever the context is clear.
A solution (M, z) is stable if for all uv ∈M we have zuv ≥ αu(M, z), and for
all unsaturated vertices u we have αu(M, z) = 0.
A solution (M, z) is balanced if it is stable and in addition for all uv ∈M we
have zuv − αu(M, z) = zvu − αv(M, z).
2.1 Special case: unit capacities
The definitions from the previous section simplify in the case where all vertices
have unit capacities. Specifically a solution to the unit capacity game (G,w) is
a pair (M,x) where M is now a matching of G and x ∈ R|V (G)|+ assigns a value
to each vertex such that for all edges uv ∈ M we have xu + xv = wuv and for
all u ∈ V (G) not covered by M we have xu = 0. Since each vertex has at most
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one unique contract, the vector x from the solution (M,x) is also the allocation
vector in this case.
The outside option of vertex u can now be expressed as
αu(M,x) := max
v:uv∈E(G)\M
(wuv − xv) ,
where as before we set αu(M,x) = 0 whenever {v : uv ∈ E(G)\M} = ∅.
A solution (M,x) is stable if for all u ∈ V (G) we have xu ≥ αu(M,x) and
balanced if it is stable and in addition xu − αu(M,x) = xv − αv(M,x) for all
uv ∈M .
2.2 Cooperative games
Given an instance (G,w, c) of the network bargaining game we let N = V (G)
and define the value ν(S) of a set of vertices S ⊆ N as
ν(S) := max
M c-matching of G[S]
w(M).
Then the pair (N, v) denotes an instance of the matching game of Shapley and
Shubik [1971]. We will refer to this as the matching game associated with the
instance (G,w, c).
Given x ∈ R|N |+ and two vertices u, v ∈ V (G) we define the power of vertex
u over vertex v with respect to the vector x as
suv(x) := max
S⊆N :u∈S,v/∈S
ν(S)− x(S),
where x(S) =
∑
u∈S xu. We write suv instead of suv(x) whenever the context is
clear. The core of the game is defined as the set
C :=
{
x ∈ R|N |+ : x(S) ≥ ν(S), ∀S ⊂ N, x(N) = ν(N)
}
.
The prekernel of the game is the set
K :=
{
x ∈ R|N |+ : suv(x) = svu(x) ∀u, v ∈ N
}
.
3 Balanced solutions via cooperative games
The first attempt towards computing balanced solutions for the network bar-
gaining game with general capacities is to use the connection to cooperative
games presented in [2010]. For the special class of unit capacity and constrained
bipartite games, Bateni et al. show that the set of stable solutions corresponds
to the core, and the set of balanced solutions corresponds to the intersection
of the core and prekernel of the associated matching game. This implies that
efficient algorithms, such as the one of [1998], can be used to compute points in
the intersection of the core and prekernel from which a balanced solution can be
uniquely obtained.
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3.1 Allocations in C ∩ K with no corresponding balanced solutions
The first question of interest is whether this equivalence between balanced solu-
tions and the intersection of the core and prekernel extends to network bargain-
ing games with arbitrary capacities. The following lemma proves that this is not
always the case.
Lemma 1. There exists an instance (G,w, c) of the network bargaining game
and a vector x ∈ C∩K such that there exists no balanced solution (M, z) satisfying
xu =
∑
v:uv∈M zuv for all u ∈ V (G).
Proof. Consider the following graph where every vertex has capacity 2 and the
edge weights are given above each edge
Consider the vector x defined as xu = 20 for all u ∈ V (G). We now show
that the vector x is in the intersection of the core and prekernel and there exists
no balanced solution (M, z) corresponding to x.
Let C1 denote the outer cycle on vertices A,B,C,D,E, F and let C2 and C3
denote the inner cycles on vertices B,C,D,E and E,F,A,B respectively. The
unique optimal 2-matching is the cycle C1 with weight 120. Since any stable,
and therefore balanced, solution must occur on a maximum weight c-matching
[2010], any balanced solution (M, z) will have M = E(C1).
It can be easily checked that x ∈ C. To check that x ∈ K we compute the
powers suv(x) := maxT :u∈T,v/∈T ν(T )−x(T ) for all pairs of vertices u, v ∈ V (G).
For the pair A,B we have:
sAB = ν ({A,F})− x ({A,F}) = 30− 40 = −10
sBA = ν ({C2})− x ({C2}) = 70− 80 = −10.
Similarly for the pair B,C we have:
sBC = ν ({C3})− x ({C3}) = 70− 80 = −10
sCB = ν ({C,D})− x ({C,D}) = 30− 40 = −10.
And for the pair C,D:
sCD = ν ({C})− x ({C}) = −20
sDC = ν ({D})− x ({D}) = −20.
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Hence the pairs (A,B), (B,C) and (C,D) satisfy the prekernel condition. By
symmetry so do (D,E), (E,F ) and (F,A).
Note that for any pair u, v of non-adjacent vertices, one of the two cycles C2
or C3 will contain u but not v, and viceversa. Therefore suv = svu = −10 for all
non-adjacent pairs u, v. This proves that x is in the prekernel.
We now show that there is no vector z such that (M, z) is a balanced solution
corresponding to the vector x. First note that vertices A,F,C and D have an
outside option of zero in any solution, since there are no edges in E\M incident
with these vertices. Hence the contracts (C,D) and (A,F ) have to be split evenly
in any balanced solution. Since each vertex must have a total profit of 20 from
its two contracts in M , this uniquely determines all values of the vector z, which
are shown in the figure below
The minimum contract of both B and E is 5 and therefore αB = αE = 10−5 = 5.
However, the edge (B,C) (and also the edge (E,F ) by symmetry) violates the
balance condition since zBC − αB = 15− 5 = 10 while zCB − αC = 5− 0 = 5.
Note that this instance does possess a balanced solution as shown in the
figure below
Here the outside option of both B and E is 10/3 and all edges in the matching
satisfy the balance condition. We also remark that the allocation associated with
this balanced solution is also in the intersection of the core and prekernel. uunionsq
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In view of Lemma 1, we cannot hope to extend the correspondence between
balanced solutions and allocations in the intersection of the core and prekernel
to all network bargaining games. However we can generalize the results of [2010]
by characterizing a larger class of network bargaining games, including unit
capacity and constrained bipartite games, for which this correspondence holds.
We achieve this by defining a certain gadget whose absence, together with the
fact that the c-matching M is acyclic, will be sufficient for the correspondence
to hold.
3.2 Gadgets
Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and (M, z) a solu-
tion. Consider a vertex u ∈ V (G) with αu(M, z) > 0 and let v be a neighbour
of u in M . Let v′ be vertex u’s best outside option and if v′ is saturated in M ,
let u′ be its weakest contract. Using these definitions we have
αu(M, z) = wuv′ − 1[dv′=cv′ ]zv′u′ .
We say that u is a bad vertex in the solution (M, z) if at least one of the
following two conditions holds:
1. There is a v − v′ path in M ,
2. There is a u− u′ path in M , that does not pass through vertex v′.
We refer to such v − v′ or u − u′ paths as gadgets of the solution (M, z). The
following figure depicts these two types of gadgets, solid lines denote edges in M
and dashed lines denote edges in E\M .
3.3 Sufficient conditions for correspondence between set of balanced
solutions and C ∩ K
We can now state our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 1. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game. Let
x ∈ C and (M, z) be a corresponding stable solution so that xu =
∑
v:uv∈M zuv
for all u ∈ V (G). If the following two conditions are satisfied
1. M is acyclic,
2. there are no bad vertices in the solution (M, z),
8
then, the following statement holds
(M, z) is a balanced solution if and only if x ∈ K.
Proof. Fix uv ∈ M . Note that it suffices to show suv = −zuv + αu, since this
would imply that suv = svu if and only if zuv−αu = zvu−αv. Our strategy is to
first show that suv is upper bounded −zuv + αu, after which it will be sufficient
to find a set T for which ν(T )− x(T ) achieves this upper bound. We start with
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. suv ≤ −zuv + αu.
Proof. Let T ⊂ N such that u ∈ T and v /∈ T . Let M ′ be a maximum weight
c-matching in G[T ]. Then
ν(T )− x(T ) = w(M ′)−
∑
a∈T
xa
= w(M ′)−
∑
a∈T,ab∈M
zab
=
w(M ′ ∩M)− ∑
a∈T, ab∈M∩M ′
zab
+
w(M ′\M)− ∑
a∈T, ab∈M\M ′
zab

= w(M ′\M)−
∑
a∈T, ab∈M\M ′
zab.
Define the set of ordered pairs
S := {(a, b) : a ∈ T ∩ V (G), b ∈ V (G), ab ∈M\M ′} ,
so that
ν(T )− x(T ) = w(M ′\M)−
∑
(a,b)∈S
zab. (1)
Since (M, z) is a stable solution it follows that M is a c-matching of maximum
weight. Hence any edge in M ′\M must have at least one saturated endpoint.
Let {a1, · · · , a`} be the set of vertices in T which are saturated in M . For each
i ∈ [`] define the sets of ordered pairs
Ei := {(ai, b) : aib ∈M ′\M}
Fi := {(ai, c) : aic ∈M\M ′} .
Note that all these sets are pairwise disjoint, and Fi ⊂ S for all i ∈ [`]. Now
since each ai is saturated in M it follows that |Ei| ≤ |Fi|. Therefore we can fix
an arbitrary mapping
φi : Ei → Fi
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so that each element of Ei is mapped to a distinct element of Fi.
We now assign to each edge e ∈M ′\M a set of ordered elements Se ⊂ S. As
previously observed, each such edge e must have at least one saturated endpoint.
Hence let e = aiy and define:
Se =
{
{φi(ai, aj), φj (aj , ai)} if y = aj for some j ∈ [`]\ {i},
{φi (ai, y)} otherwise.
It follows from the definition of the sets Ei and the choice of the mapping φi that
the sets Se are well defined, are pairwise disjoint, and are all subsets of S. Let
S ′ := S\ (∪e∈M ′\MSe) ,
Then from equation (1) and the fact that each ordered pair of S belongs to at
most one Se set we obtain
ν(T )− x(T ) ≤
∑
e∈M ′\M
we − ∑
(a,b)∈Se
zab
− ∑
(a,b)∈S′
zab. (2)
Now it follows from stability that for all e ∈M ′\M we have
we ≤
∑
(a,b)∈Se
zab. (3)
To see this, consider e = aiy ∈ M ′\M . If y = aj for some j ∈ [`]\ {i} then
Se := {φi(ai, aj), φj(aj , ai)}. Now φi(ai, aj) represents the profit that ai gets
from one of his contracts in M , and similarly φj (aj , ai) represents the profit
that aj earns from one of his contracts in M . Since the edge aiaj is not in M ,
by stability we must have φi(ai, aj) + φj(aj , ai) ≥ waiy,.
In the other case where y is not a saturated vertex in T , we have Se =
{φi ((ai, y))}. Since y is an outside option for ai and φi (ai, y) represents the
profit that ai gets from one of his contracts in M , stability for vertex ai implies
that φi (ai, y) ≥ waiy as required.
Now suppose that (u, v) /∈ ∪e∈M ′\MSe. Then from (2) and (3) we have
ν(T )− x(T ) ≤ −zuv.
Since αu ≥ 0, this proves the lemma in this case. If on the other hand, there
exists a set Se∗ such that (u, v) ∈ Se∗ . Then using (2) and (3) again we have
ν(T )− x(T ) ≤ −zuv + we∗ −
∑
(a,b)∈Se∗\{(u,v)}
zuv,
Now (u, v) ∈ Se∗ implies that e∗ must be an edge in M ′\M that is incident to
vertex u. Hence e∗ = uw where w is an outside option for vertex u. If w is not
saturated then the set Se∗\ {(uv)} is empty. Otherwise if w is saturated, this
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set contains a unique ordered pair (w, k) such that wk ∈ M\M ′. Therefore it
follows from the definition of αu that
ν(T )− x(T ) ≤ −zuv + αu,
as desired. uunionsq
Hence it suffices to find a set T ⊆ V (G) such that u ∈ T , v /∈ T and show
that ν(T )− x(T ) ≥ −zuv + αu. Given a set of vertices S we let MS denote the
edges of M which have both endpoints in S. Note that for any set of vertices S
we have
w(MS)− x(S) = −
∑
ab∈M :a∈S,b/∈S
zab. (4)
We define C to be the set of components of G induced by the edges in M .
Since u and v are neighbours in M they will be in the same component, call it C.
Now suppose we remove the edge uv from C. Since M is acyclic, this disconnects
C into two components Cu and Cv, containing vertices u and v respectively. Now
MCu is a valid c-matching of Cu hence applying equation (4) to the vertex set
the component Cu we obtain
ν(Cu)− x(Cu) ≥ w(MCu)− x(Cu) = −zuv.
If αu = 0 then setting T to be the vertex set of component Cu completes the
proof for this case. Hence it remains to consider the case where αu > 0. Then
by stability of the solution (M, z) vertex u must be saturated in M . Let v′ be
vertex u’s best outside option.
Case 1: v′ ∈ Cu and v′ is not saturated in M . Since uv /∈ Cu and v′ is not
saturated in M the set of edges MCu ∪ {uv′} is a valid c-matching of Cu and
therefore
ν(Cu)− x(Cu) ≥ w(MCu ∪ {uv′})− x(Cu)
= w(MCu)− x(Cu) + wuv′
= −zuv + wuv′ applying (4) to Cu.
Case 2: v′ ∈ Cu and v′ is saturated in M . Let u′ be the weakest contract
of v′ and suppose we remove the edge v′u′ from Cu. Since M is acyclic, this
disconnects Cu into two components. From condition (2) we know that u
′ is not
on the u−v′ path in M . Hence u and v′ are in the same component of Cu\ {v′u′}.
Denote this component by Du. Now MDu ∪{uv′} is a c-matching of Du and thus
ν(Du)− x(Du) ≥ w (MDu ∪ {uv′})− x(Du)
= w(MDu)− x(Du) + +wuv′
= −zuv − zv′u′′ + +wuv′ applying (4) to Du
= −zuv + αu by choice of v′ and u′.
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(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
Fig. 1. Cases 1 and 2 in the proof Theorem 1
Case 3: v′ /∈ Cu and v′ is not saturated in M . Condition (2) implies that
there is no v − v′ path in M , hence the fact that v′ /∈ Cu implies that v′ /∈ C.
Let Cv′ be the component in C that contains vertex v′. Now MCu ∪MCv′ ∪{uv′}
is a c-matching of Cu ∪ Cv′ and therefore
ν(Cu ∪ Cj′)− x(Cu ∪ Cv′) ≥ w(MCu ∪MCv′ ∪ {uv′})− x(Cu ∪ Cv′)
= (w(MCu)− x(Cu)) +
(
w(MCv′ )− x(Cv′)
)
+ wuv′
= −zuv + wuv′ applying (4) to Cu, Cv′
= −zuv + αu by choice of v′.
Fig. 2. Case 3 in the proof Theorem 1
Case 4: v′ /∈ Cu and v′ is saturated in M . As in Case 3 we let Cv′ be the
component in C that contains vertex v′. Let u′ be the weakest contract of v′ and
suppose we remove the edge v′u′ from Cv′ . Since M is acyclic, this disconnects
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Cv′ into two components and we let Dv′ be the one that contains vertex v
′. Now
MCu ∪MDv′ ∪ {uv′} is a c-matching of Cu ∪ Cv′ thus
ν(Cu ∪Dv′)− x(Cu ∪Dv′) ≥ w
(
MCu ∪MDv′ ∪ {uv′}
)− x (Cu ∪ Cv′)
= (w(MCu)− x(Cu)) +
(
w(MDv′ )− x(Dv′)
)
+ wuv′
= −zuv − zv′u′ + wuv′ applying (4) to Cu , Dv′
= −zuv + αu by choice of v′ and u′.
Fig. 3. Case 4 in the proof Theorem 1
Hence in all cases we have ν(T ) − x(T ) ≥ −zuv + αu as required. This
completes the proof of the theorem. uunionsq
We note that all network bargaining games studied in [2010] satisfy conditions
(1) and (2) of Theorem 1. In addition to these, Theorem 1 also covers the case of
network bargaining games where the underlying graph is a tree, but the vertices
are allowed to have arbitrary capacities. Hence starting with a maximum weight
c-matching M we can use the polynomial time algorithm of [1998] to compute a
point in the intersection of the core and prekernel for these games, from which
we can obtain a corresponding solution (M, z). Then using Theorem 1 we know
that (M, z) will be balanced.
4 Balanced solutions via reduction to the unit capacity
games
While we were able to generalize the class of network bargaining games for which
balanced solutions can be obtained by computing a point in the intersection of
the core and prekernel, we were not able to apply this technique to all network
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bargaining games. In this section we show that balanced solutions can be ob-
tained to any network bargaining game (G,w, c) by a reduction to a unit capacity
game defined on an auxiliary graph.
4.1 Construction of the instance (G′, w′) and matching M ′
Suppose we are given an instance (G,w, c) of the network bargaining game to-
gether with a c-matching M of G. We describe below how to obtain an instance
(G′, w′) of the unit capacity game together with a matching M of G.
Construction: [(G,w, c) ,M ]→ [(G′, w′),M ′]
1. for each u ∈ V (G): fix an arbitrary labelling σu : {v : uv ∈M} → {1, · · · , d(u)}
and create cu copies u1, · · · , ucu in V (G′).
2. for each uv in E(G) ∩M : add the edge uσv(u)vσu(v) to E(G′) ∩M ′ and set
its weight to wuv.
3. for each edge uv ∈ E(G)\M : add all edges uivj to E(G′) for all i ∈ [cu] and
j ∈ [cv], and set all their weights to wuv.
Example 1: Consider the instance depicted on the left hand side of the figure
below. The solid edges are in the c-matching M and the dotted edges are in
E\M . Node u has capacity four, nodes x and y have capacity two and all other
nodes have capacity one. All edges have unit weight.
We make four copies of u in G′, two copies of x and y, and one copy of every
other node. Each edge in M corresponds to a unique edge in M ′. For the edges
uv and uw which are not in M , we connect every copy of u to every copy of v
and w with edges in E(G′)\M ′. The resulting graph is on the right.
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4.2 Mapping between the two solution sets
Suppose we are given an instance of the network bargaining game (G,w, c) with
a c-matching M . Let [(G′, w′),M ′] be obtained using the construction given in
section 4.1. Note that M and M ′ have the same number of edges and each edge
uv ∈M is mapped to the unique edge uivj ∈M ′ where i = σv(u) and j = σu(v).
This allows us to go back and forth between solutions on M and M ′ by dividing
the weight of each edge in the same way as its corresponding pair.
We define the two solution sets:
X :=
{
x ∈ R|V (G′)| : (M ′, x) is a solution to (G′, w′)
}
Z :=
{
z ∈ R2|E(G)| : (M, z) is a solution to (G,w, c)
}
.
And the two mappings:
1. φ : X → Z
For all uv ∈ E define
(φ(x)uv, φ(x)vu) :=
{(
xuσv(u) , xvσu(v)
)
if uv ∈M ,
(0, 0) otherwise.
2. φ−1 : Z → X .
For all ui ∈ V (G′) define
φ−1(z)ui :=
{
zuv if i = σu(v),
0 otherwise.
Note that z = φ(x) if and only if x = φ−1(z). The following lemma shows
that the mapping given by the function φ and its inverse φ−1 defines a bijection
between the X and Z
Lemma 3. 1. If x ∈ X and z = φ(x), then z ∈ Z.
2. If z ∈ Z and x = φ−1(z) then x ∈ X .
Proof. Let x ∈ X and z = φ(x). We show that z ∈ Z. Take uv ∈ E(G) ∩M .
Suppose i = σv(u) and j = σu(v). Then from the construction of G
′ and M ′ it
follows that uivj ∈M ′. We have
zuv + zvu = xui + xvj from the definition of φ(x)
= wuiuj since (M
′, x) is a solution
= wuv from the construction of (G
′, w′).
Furthermore if uv ∈ E(G)\M then from the definition of φ(x) we have zuv =
zvu = 0.
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Now let z ∈ Z and x = φ−1(z). We show that x ∈ X . Take uivj ∈ E(G′)∩M ′.
From the construction of G′ and M ′ there must exist an edge uv ∈ E(G) ∩M
such that i = σv(u) and j = σu(v). We have
xui + xvj = zuv + zvu from the definition of φ
−1(z)
= wuv since (M, z) is a solution
= wuivj from the construction of (G
′, w′).
Furthermore if ui is uncovered in M
′ then xui = 0 by definition. uunionsq
From now on we write (M, z) ∼ (M ′, x) whenever z = φ(x) or equivalently
x = φ−1(z). The next lemma is the key step in showing that certain properties
of a solution are preserved under our mapping.
Lemma 4. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and M
a c-matching on G. Suppose the auxiliary instance (G′, w′) and the matching M ′
were obtained using the construction given in section 4.1. Let (M, z) be a solution
to (G,w, c) and (M ′, x′) a solution to (G′, w′) such that (M, z) ∼ (M ′, x). Then
for any u ∈ V (G) and any i ∈ [du] we have
αu(M, z) = αui (M
′, x) .
Proof. We first show that αu(M, z) ≤ αui (M ′, x). We may assume that αu(M, z) >
0 since otherwise there is nothing to show. Let v be vertex u’s best outside option
in (M, z). That is uv ∈ E(G)\M and
αu(M, z) = wuv − 1[dv=cv ] min
vw∈M
zvw.
Since uv ∈ E(G)\M we have uivj ∈ E(G′)\M ′ for all j ∈ [cv]. We have two
cases:
1. v is not saturated in M . Then the vertex vdv+1 is in V (G
′) and it is not
covered by M ′. Since uivdv+1 ∈ E(G′)\M ′ we have
αui (M
′, x) ≥ wuivdv+1 − xvdv+1
= wuivdv+1 vdv+1 is not covered by M
′ so xvdv+1 = 0
= wuv from the definition of (G
′, w′)
= αu(M, z) by choice of v.
2. v is saturated in M . Let w = arg minvw∈M zvw. Suppose that j = σw(v).
Then vj is covered in M
′ and xvj = zvw. Since uivj ∈ E(G′)\M ′ we have
αui (M
′, x) ≥ wuivj − xvj
= wuv − zvw from the definition of (G′, w′)
= αu(M, z) by choice of v.
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We now show that αu(M, z) ≥ αui (M ′, x). We may assume that αui (M ′, x) >
0. Let vj be vertex ui’s best outside option in (M
′, x). That is, vj ∈ V (G′) such
that uivj ∈ E(G′)\M ′ and
αui(M
′, x) = wuivj − xvj .
Since uivj ∈ E(G′)\M ′ we must have uv ∈ E(G)\M . Again, we have two cases:
1. vj is not covered in M
′. Then the vertex v is not saturated in M and
αu(M, z) ≥ wuv
= wuivj from the definition of (G
′, w′)
= wujvj − xvj vj is not covered in M ′ so xvj = 0
= αui (M
′, x) by choice of vj .
2. vj is covered in M . Then there exists w ∈ V (G) such that vw ∈ E(G) ∩M
and j = σw(v) . We have
αu(M, z) ≥ wuv − zvw
= wuivj − xvj from the definition of (G′, w′)
= αui (M
′, x) by choice of vj .
uunionsq
Using Lemma 4 we can now prove that stability and balance are preserved
when mapping between solutions of the network bargaining game and the cor-
responding unit capacity game of the auxiliary instance.
Theorem 2. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and M
a c-matching on G. Suppose the auxiliary instance (G′, w′) and the matching M ′
were obtained using the construction given in section 4.1. Let (M, z) be a solution
to (G,w, c) and (M ′, x′) a solution to (G′, w′) such that (M, z) ∼ (M ′, x). Then:
1. (M, z) is stable if and only if (M ′, x) is stable.
2. (M, z) is balanced if and only if (M ′, x) is balanced.
Proof. Let uv ∈M . Suppose that i = σv(u). Then zuv = xui and using Lemma
4 we have
zuv ≥ αu(M, z) if and only if xui ≥ αuσv(u) (M ′, x) .
It remains to show that if (M ′, x) is stable then αu(M, z) = 0 for any unsaturated
vertices u of G. Suppose u is such a vertex. Then the vertex udu+1 is not covered
in M ′ and therefore x′du+1 = 0. If (M
′, x) is stable then αudu+1 = 0 and by
Lemma 4 we have αu(M, z) = 0 as desired. This completes the proof of the
first statement. To prove the second statement let uv ∈ M and suppose that
i = σv(u) and j = σu(v). Then zuv = xui , zvu = xvj and by Lemma 4 we have:
zuv − αu(M, z) = zvu − αv(M, z) ⇔ xui − αui (M ′, x) = xvj − αvj (M ′, x) .
This completes the proof. uunionsq
17
4.3 Algorithm for computing balanced solutions
Using Theorem 2 we have the following algorithm for finding a balanced solution
to the network bargaining game (G,w, c):
1. Find a maximum c-matching M in G.
2. Obtain unit capacity game (G′, w′) with matching M ′ using the construction
from section 4.1.
3. Find a balanced solution x on the matching M ′ in G′.
4. Set z = φ(x) and return (M, z).
We note that step 3 of the algorithm can be implementing using the existing
polynomial time algorithm of Kleinberg and Tardos [2008]. Given any instance of
a network bargaining game with unit capacities together with a maximum weight
matching, their algorithm returns a balanced solution on the given matching,
whenever one exists.
4.4 Existence of balanced solutions
Using Theorem 2 we know that stable solutions of the original problem map to
stable solutions of the matching problem and viceversa. Since any stable solution
must occur on a c-matching, respectively matching, of maximum weight we have
the following corollary
Corollary 1. Let (G,w, c) be an instance of the network bargaining game and
M a c-matching on G. Suppose the auxiliary instance (G′, w′) and the matching
M ′ were obtained using the given construction. Then
1. M is a maximum weight c-matching for (G,w, c) if and only if M ′ is a
maximum weight matching for (G′, w′).
2. There exists a balanced solution for (G,w, c) on the c-matching M if and
only if there exists a balanced solution for (G′, w′) on the matching M ′.
It was previously shown in [2008] that a unit capacity game possesses a bal-
anced solution if and only if it has a stable solution, which in turn happens if and
only if the linear program for the maximum weight matching of the underlying
graph has an integral optimal solution. For the case of network bargaining game
with general capacities, [2009] have shown that a stable solution exists if and
only if the linear program for the maximum weight c-matching of the underlying
graph has an integral optimal solution. In terms of existence of balanced solu-
tions, they only obtain a partial characterization by proving that if this integral
optimum is unique, then a balanced solution is guaranteed to exist. Our results
imply the following full characterization for the existence of balanced solutions,
thus extending the results of [2009]:
Theorem 3. An instance (G,w, c) of the network bargaining game has a bal-
anced solution if and only if it has a stable one.
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